By Max Siollun
Less than a year ago, the militant group Boko Haram controlled an
area of northeastern Nigeria
the size of Belgium .
It was “a mortuary for the uncooperative and prison for the conquered,” as one
unlucky resident described it to me at the time, and it threatened to engulf
ever more of the country. The brutal Islamist insurgency had sapped the morale
and discipline of the Nigerian army and seemed poised to carve out a caliphate
that rivaled the one it had pledged loyalty to in Iraq
and Syria .
Fast-forward just 10 months and the idea of an Islamic caliphate
in northern Nigeria
seems a distant memory. Delusions of statehood caused Boko Haram’s leaders to
overreach, inviting a powerful regional military response and bolstering the
candidacy of former Nigerian military leader Muhammadu Buhari, who set about
crushing the Islamist insurgency after winning the presidency in March. A
regional military coalition led by Nigeria
has recaptured much of the territory Boko Haram once controlled and driven its
fighters into remote regions in Nigeria ’s
northeastern corner.
But if Boko Haram has seen its territorial ambitions dashed in
recent months, it is hardly on the verge of defeat. In a way, Boko Haram has
come full circle, reverting back to the kind of asymmetrical warfare that was
once its grisly hallmark. As a result, the group poses as much of a danger to
civilians now as it did when it fought to control cities and towns. In the last
six months alone, Boko Haram has killed nearly 1,500 people.
What explains the rollercoaster ride of the last 10 months? Part
of the answer is hubris. Last month, a senior Nigerian military officer told me
that the publicity Boko Haram garnered from its 2014 kidnapping of more than
200 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok emboldened the group’s leaders to be
more ambitious, resulting in costly mistakes. Instead of sticking to the
hit-and-run tactics that it had used to successfully torment the Nigerian
military for years, Boko Haram began to seize and hold territory, boldly declaring
an Islamic “caliphate” in the areas
it had conquered. This stretched the group’s resources too thin and forced it
into a conventional war with the Nigerian military that it could not win. Boko
Haram also shed its domestic focus, launching cross-border raids into
neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, all of which eventually joined a
five-nation military coalition against it (along with Benin and Nigeria).